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The questions of development and 
global inequality appear to be the crucial 
problems of modern world. These ques-
tions played significant role in the post-
war world after 1945. One of the pheno- 
mena of the Cold War period was 
a decolonization in the then emerging 
Third World. After 1945 the world had 
entered into the phase of radical changes 
because of the fall of existing European 
powers’ position. The colonial empires like 
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium were unable to control their colo-
nies anymore, however they made 
attempts to do it. The political elites of 
those colonial European countries were 
unable to accept the fact that the nations 
of Asia (later Africa) expected indepen-
dence and the right to self-government.
 
The Colonial powers couldn’t restrain the will of the 
peoples to gain control over the main assets of colonies and 
dependent territories. The process of decolonization was in 
fact inevitable as the position of the colonial states, especially 
France and the United Kingdom, became considerably under-
mined as a consequence of the Second World War. The inter-
national community led by the United States, the main founder 
of the United Nations, rejected the idea of maintaining colonial 
ties. This new approach, declared primarily by the Allies in the 
Atlantic Charter (however the British Prime Minister later dis-
tanced himself from the anticolonial meaning of this procla-
mation of war aims), found full expression in the UN Charter. 
Both documents expressed the anticolonial sentiment which 
started to prevail in the postwar world.1 
However the European states were unable to keep the 
colonies and territories under their sovereign power, they were 
able to secure their control over main economic assets of for-
mer colonies. In the next years and decades many nations of 
Asia and Africa gained independence. All them, with older 
Latin American nations, were depicted as Third World coun-
tries. All of them were extremely vulnerable for radical ideolo-
gies: communism and nationalism.2 
The Third World played particularly important role in 
the Cold War era; it was in the center of US and Soviet policy. 
Both superpowers aimed to attract developing countries be-
cause the potential of Asian and African nations couldn’t be 
neglected in the global rivalry of East and West. Latin America 
was a somewhat different case since historically it has always 
been in the US sphere of influence. However, this region be-
came also vulnerable for the influence of communist ideology 
after the Second World War. The rise of communist sentiment in 
Latin America, as well as in Asia and Africa, should be ascribed 
to tremendous social inequality and tensions. The colonial rela-
1  Latham 2011: 25-26; Judt 2008: 330-333.
2  Hahn, Heiss 2001; See also: Kula 1991: 54-82.
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tions were based on an idea of natural resources exploitation 
by European powers. That kind of development characterized 
also Latin America. Thus, the economic and social situation of 
developing countries was the infamous heritage of their colo-
nial past and/or dependency. This has clear consequences for 
the political attitude of both nations and elites in developing 
countries (Third World). Since they rejected the idea of coope- 
ration with former metropolises and looked for the ideologi-
cal expression of their national and economic aspirations, the 
Soviet Union appeared “natural” ally of developing countries. 
The USSR was determined to use the ideological 
“appeal” of international communism to spread Soviet influence 
over the Third World. In the 1960s Soviet determination to sup-
port revolutionary movements even grew. Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev proclaimed aid for “wars of national liberation” 
and the USSR transferred ideas, money and advisors to Asian 
and Latin American states which were “infected” by a revolu-
tion.3 But it would be a mistake to attribute the development 
of revolutionary movements to the Soviet interference only. It 
was a mistake made by many leaders of the Western World, 
especially Americans, who falsely assumed that revolution is 
“exported” by their communist rival.4 It is true that Soviet lea- 
ders generously helped Castro’s Cuba, indirectly exporting re- 
volution to other Latin American countries due to its alliance 
with Cuba (it is doubtful that the idea of a continental revolu-
tion could have been promoted by Castro without Soviet aid 
for his country). But in many areas of the world, revolution was 
a consequence of the local situation. 
The United States have never been a colonial superpo- 
wer. For that reason American political leaders believed that 
their country was not discredited in the emerging Third World 
and could attract new and old nations of Asia and Latin Ameri-
ca. To some extent such views were justified. On the other hand, 
the United States were and still remain the leader of the West. 
3  Zubok, Pleszakow 1999: 309-312.
4  US secretary of State John Foster Dulles is good example of such a false 
logic that Latin American revolution was “imported” form the Commu-
nist powers. See: Rabe 1988: 31.
In the perception of developing countries, this superpower was 
naturally inclined to economically and politically dominate 
the “peripheries.” The United States, as a homeland of modern 
capitalism was perceived as a power interested in expanding 
the export markets for American products and securing the ac-
cess to natural resources. Thus, the elites of “emerging” nations 
were afraid that close relations with the USA would have pe- 
trified their underdevelopment. Anti-Western resentment was 
an additional factor, which discouraged the Third World from 
searching closer relations with the United States. In this situa-
tion, they were interested in an alliance with the Soviet Union – 
the anti-Western force which evoked the idea of racial equality 
and self-determination of oppressed peoples.
The United States’ post-war administrations intended 
to present an ideology alternative for the Soviet communism. 
American values and its model of development should attract 
emerging developing countries. The US concept was embo- 
died in modernization theory, which was developed particularly 
in the 1950s and 1960s. This theory played a significant role in 
formulating US policy toward developing countries especially 
in that period, but also later. It is important to realize that the 
United States had always been prone to influence the world and 
aim to change it positively. Americans were (and still are) con-
vinced about their exceptionalism and the superiority of their 
political system and economic model from the very beginning 
of their history as a nation. The opposition between “freedom” 
and “oppression” which was emphasized by the Founding Fa-
thers and ideologists of American Revolution was also exploit-
ed by American anticommunism. The Americans envisioned 
themselves as the leader of the free world in the 20th century 
as they did in the past. Thus, the “Manifest Destiny” shouldn’t 
be treated only as a historical document. The idea, which was 
the fundament of the Manifest Destiny, dictated that the Uni- 
ted States had an exceptional political system, distinct from any 
other in the world, influenced by the strong American convi- 
ction that the US was entitled to spread its values as morally su-
perior. Moreover, this constantly influences US foreign policy. 
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It is a matter of dispute whether the Manifest Destiny was re-
placed by US imperialism or, rather the former influenced the 
latter.5 
The United States as a growing power in the turn of 
nineteenth and twentieth century, began to exceed its influence 
over the foreign territories and nations, like the Philippines and 
Cuba. The motives which pushed the United States towards ex-
pansion were mainly economic and political, and imperialistic. 
The United States aimed to expand its markets and gain access 
to new sources. But in the same time US politicians coined the 
idea of civilizing the underdeveloped nations, they intended to 
bear a kind of American “white man’s burden.”6 
The concept that the United States could be a civilizing 
force developed together with the position of states in the inter-
national system of the twentieth century. According to scholars 
on that subject, the myth of the chosen nation was reflected 
in the history of American foreign relations after the Second 
World War in the context of global revolution. The revolution-
ary nations expected to achieve the same material level and val-
ues that Americans had reached.7 US leaders sought for ways 
to allow them to achieve this aim without a Marxist revolution. 
The US political elite did this not only for idealistic reasons (de-
scribed above) but also because of national security demands. 
In this text the author tries to answer the question what 
was the nature of American involvement in the developing 
countries after the Second World War? How did the US admi- 
nistrations envisioned the process of progress in the countries 
that emerged or regained independence in the Third World? 
What elements constituted mutual relations between the 
American superpower and developing countries in the Cold 
War period? 
The engagement of the United States in foreign coun-
tries in the 20th century, especially after the Second World War 
5  Coles 2002: 403-404. 
6  Latham 2011: 12-14. 
7  Coles 2002: 406. 
can be considered a fulfillment of the US mission in the world, 
a mission proclaimed as a consequence of their Manifest Des-
tiny. It is a “mission by intervention,” justified by the nature of 
the goals, which the USA wants to realize. The belief that devel-
oping countries required American tutelage in the process of 
social and political modernization determined US policy from 
the beginning to expand it beyond the borders of the continent. 
The position of the developing countries and their at-
titude towards the USA contributed to dependency theory, de-
veloped in the postwar economic sciences, particularly in the 
countries of the so-called global South.8 In the perspective of de-
pendency theory, underdevelopment was not a stage of growth, 
nor a phase of development. It was a social and economic stag-
nation petrified both by developed countries and local elites, 
not interested in changing a situation, which was profitable for 
them. According to one of the most prominent postwar Latin 
American economists, Raul Prebisch, the inequality was fro-
zen by the deteriorating terms of trade in the world. Develo- 
ping countries had to export more products just to receive the 
assets for more expensive products imported from developed 
countries. The inequality of prices between mainly agricultural 
products of mono-export developing countries and advanced 
industrial products of developed ones created permanent trade 
deficit. The desperate need of capital in underdeveloped coun-
tries made them to take out loans in countries like the United 
States. It deepened the dependency of the South.9 
The economists from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (structuralists) looked for 
a solution to that Gordian knot. They believed that the deve- 
loping countries should focus on building their own industry. 
The process of industrialization required the protection of de-
veloping economies by applying high tariffs and, at least in the 
beginning of this process – the growth of foreign debt. The de-
pendency theorists and structuralists influenced a brand new 
8  In opposition to the wealthy North, the underdeveloped, poor South 
seems to be the most popular depiction in modern development studies 
recently. 
9  Franko 2003: 52-54. 
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economic policy in Latin America: import substitution and in-
dustrialization.10 
This policy was not successful and contributed to the 
further decline of Latin American economies. The other path 
of development was worked out by American economists who 
perceived the deteriorating economic situation in the Third 
World as a main factor, which fueled revolutionary movements. 
We can analyze the tools of US foreign policy in the di-
mension of economic aid on the basis of programs addressed 
to developing nations. Let’s consider Alliance for Progress as 
an example of US economic but strictly politically motivated 
program. Alliance is one of the best examples of modernization 
theory which have played significant role in US foreign policy 
after the Second World War. The basic reason why the Uni- 
ted States was interested in implementation of such a program 
was the Cuban revolution effect. Alliance for Progress was not 
the first, neither the biggest aid program offered by the United 
States after the Second World War. One should remember that 
the fear of Communism motivated also the European Recov-
ery Plan, called the Marshall Plan. The United States was afraid 
that if living conditions in Europe were deteriorating, Com-
munist parties in Western Europe would seize power in demo-
cratic elections. This scenario was not unrealistic since Com-
munists received growing electoral support in leading western 
countries like France and Italy.11 The economic motives of the 
Marshall Plan should not be neglected. The US economy, which 
productivity grew tremendously during the Second World War 
(effectively making an end to the Great Depression), needed 
the European market for its export. With an European econo-
my in stagnation, the US economy would have faced recession. 
 
 The two factors of equal importance drove the United 
States to offer generous aid programs to European countries. 
Political developments in the next years confirmed the dia- 
10  Franko 2003: 55-56. 
11  Krasuski 1988: 18-52; Janus 2001: 38-39. 
gnosis of American policymakers that economic aid was the 
proper answer to the challenge of Marxist radicalism in Wes- 
tern Europe. Moreover, the Marshall Plan implementation 
made it possible to put nation-building ideas into operation in 
Germany. In fact, Germany and Japan are the only examples 
of successful nation-building in the post-war world.12 Western 
Europe avoided the threat of spreading communist influence. 
The same motives were behind the decision on delive- 
ring aid to developing countries during the Cold War. Prima- 
rily, the United States offered rather limited economic aid, fo-
cusing on military support. It was characteristic for the 1940s 
and 1950s. Moreover, in those decades, the United States poli-
cymakers rejected the repeating requests of Latin American 
countries which expected a kind of Marshall Plan for Latin 
America.13 However it was probably the first time when Latin 
America was ready to accept a dominating role of the USA in 
the hemisphere, Washington focused on other regions of the 
world.14 US administrations believed in the “depend on trade 
not aid” theory. It meant that growing trade relations should 
have been the best way to fuel economic development of Latin 
American countries.15 
The situation changed radically after the Cuban revolu-
tion. Even before the Castro revolution a group of American 
politicians emphasized that focusing on military aid for deve- 
loping countries was an insufficient tool. Without economic 
help the United States was unable to stop the growth of revolu-
tionary sentiments in the Third World. Senator John F. Kennedy 
was among those politicians. The future US President believed 
that the United States had to diversify its political instruments 
toward developing countries. The successful containment of 
Communism required more sophisticated tools then just mili-
tary aid and repression. Kennedy correctly assumed that deep 
social inequalities and poverty made the developing countries 
ripe for revolutions. The United States had to act to improve 
12  Dobbins et al. 2003: 3-51. 
13  Smith 1994: 62-63.
14  Kissinger 2002: 487-510.
15  Schoultz 2003: 332-333. See also: Gildherus 2006: 8-9.
| EVOLVING DEPENDENCY RELATIONS | | PARADOXES OF A MODERN IZATION THEORY. . .  |
25 26
living conditions in Latin America and democracy promo-
tion.16 The Cuban victory and the threat of a Castro-promoted 
revolution in the whole region made Latin America “the most 
dangerous area in the world” as Kennedy said. The postulate 
of democracy promotion came from a strong conviction that 
maintaining dictatorships with US support increased the dan-
ger of Marxist revolution.17 The US administrations’ attitude 
towards dictatorships in the beginning of the 1960s. was in-
fluenced not as much by moral outrage but by fear that if the 
di-ctatorships were not ousted under pressure of USA, they 
would have been destroyed by revolution. As Kennedy said 
“those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make vio-
lent revolution inevitable.” But the idea of a peaceful revolution 
for Kennedy and his team meant an evolution leading to demo- 
cracy and free market as the only option. 
Cuba was not the only subject of concern for the US ad-
ministrations in the 1960s. American policymakers were also 
afraid of the developments in Indochina, where the French re-
treat created a kind of political vacuum. Both regions – Latin 
America and Indochina – became the areas of strong US in-
volvement during the Cold War. The American intervention 
in Vietnam, which was disastrous for US foreign policy, ended 
in the 1970s but it was an equally important example of mod-
ernization attempts like US policy toward Latin America.18 
Kennedy’s administration’s attitude and policy reflected 
the views of an influential group of American intellectuals. They 
were convinced that there was a way of development alterna-
tive for the Marxist ideology of revolution. The academics who 
studied development questions of underdeveloped countries 
intended to create a coherent concept, which could be offered 
16  Kennedy 1957; Kennedy 1960: 132-133; Knothe 1976: 63-64.
17  This conviction led to the position that the Kennedy administration 
took vis-à-vis Rafael Leonidas Trujillo’s regime in the Dominican Republic 
in 1961. US policymakers were afraid that a continuation of the Trujillo 
regime would provoke a Castro-like revolution. For that reason the USA 
supported the assassination of this Dominican dictator. (Fatalski 2013: 
7-18)
18  Latham 2006: 27-41. 
to the nations of Latin America, Asia and – later – Africa. They 
coined or rather developed the modernization theory, which 
became the main inspiration for the new aid policy of the John 
F. Kennedy administration. The implementation of this mo- 
dernization theory was not limited to Latin America in the 
1960s, but US policy in this part of the world is a very illustra-
tive example of that stream of American political thought and 
practice. It is also justified to asses that it was the first attempt 
of the USA to implement such a solution in order to make the 
world better. 
The architects of this new approach to foreign aid were 
called the Charles River group. The leading modernization 
theorists, economists Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, worked 
at the Massachusetts Institute of technology. Their studies on 
modernization began in the beginning of the 1950s. The econo-
mists examined the role that foreign aid might play in US for-
eign policy. The main question they tried to answer was whe- 
ther and in what circumstances US economic aid could stimu-
late and maintain economic growth in developing countries. 
The idea that the United States administrations were able to 
change the world through foreign aid was expressed in the study 
“A Proposal: Key to Effective Foreign Policy.” Rostow developed 
the concept of modernization in his later work “The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.” The basic 
assumption of that new philosophy was that the United States 
should help the underdeveloped countries to make economic 
and social progress and promote democracy.19 Among the aca-
demics who contributed considerably to development of the 
modernization theory Lucian Pye, Daniel Lerner, Gabriel Al-
mond and James Coleman should also be mentioned.20 
Modernization theory was crucial for Millikan and Ros-
tow’s concepts. This theory tries to answer the question how 
mechanisms of development work. In other worlds, what fac-
tors decided that some nations took a leading position in so-
cial and economic progress and whether the same factors could 
be adapted to other, underdeveloped countries. To express it 
19  Taffet 2007: 20-21. 
20  Latham 2000: 3. 
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briefly, what is the mechanism which turns the traditional so-
cieties into modern ones.21 The title of Rostow’s work “A Non-
Communist Manifesto” was an expression of his presumption 
that modernization theory was an alternative to the ideology of 
communist revolution, which had started to spread in the de-
veloping countries of the Third World. Rostow defined several 
steps of the developmental evolution, from a traditional socie- 
ty to a society of mass consumption. The United States should 
help the nations in the phase preceding “take off ” to develo- 
pment because the USA was able to help them to accelerate the 
process of moving to a more advanced phase.22 
Commonly accepted opinion indicates that foreign in-
vestment plays a significant role in economic development of 
a country. The process of modernization of underdeveloped 
economy is impossible without significant foreign investments 
since developing countries always suffer from lack of capital. 
An inflow of foreign capital is necessary to change the produ- 
ction structure of a developing country and stimulate its pro-
ductivity. Otherwise it would be impossible to take the cha- 
llenge of rivalry with developed economies. 
One of the most prominent dependency theorists 
Andre Gunder Frank analyzed the flow of capital in and from 
Brazil on the basis of official data. The analyses were made in 
the 1960s. Frank questioned the popular conviction that the 
flow of investments and aid to developing countries was greater 
than the flow of capital from them. He stated that in fact, un-
derdeveloped countries pay more to the rich ones then they 
receive from them. Frank quoted the data of the US Depart-
ment of Commerce on US – Latin American economic rela-
tions to prove the statement. The data proved that in the period 
1956-61 the ratio of inflow to the United States to outflow from 
the US was 147 percent for Latin America. The ratio for under-
developed world as a whole was 164 percent and for the Wes- 
tern Europe 43 percent. In his opinion the quoted data proved 
that, at least in the analyzed period, the developing world re-
21  Taffet 2007: 21. 
22  Taffet 2007: 21. 
ceived less from the United States then the USA received from 
those countries. It is particularly visible when one compares the 
flows between the USA with developing countries and the USA 
with Western Europe.23 
Even though the US administrations stated that the ca- 
pital flows from developing countries were profits earned from 
US capital invested there, the example of Brazil in the 1960s 
questioned such an opinion. The US corporations owned Bra-
zilian corporations, but they were based on capital of Brazi- 
lian origin.24 In other words, the US corporations used Brazil-
ian capital to increase its profit. Other factors which boosted 
such an effect were government loans for US-Brazilian eco-
nomic enterprises. This process can be exemplified by loans, 
which were given to two US cotton merchants by the Brazilian 
central bank. They received 47 percent of that bank’s total loan 
portfolio for agriculture and industry. The companies re-loaned 
the money that they received at higher interest rates, bought 
up harvest stocks, kept them in silos provided by government 
and speculated the stocks later. This way the companies sized 
control over the Brazilian domestic cotton market and the ex-
port of that product. The profit was transferred to the United 
States of course.25 The same process could be observed when 
we consider the public utility sector in Brazil. American and 
Canadian companies, which operated in that sector were based 
on governmental concessions and privileges provided by public 
authorities. In other words, they also used Brazilian capital and 
received profit this way. 
The problem of creating new forms of dependency was 
not the only failure of the very promising modernization theory 
practiced by Kennedy and Johnson administration. Democrati-
zation, which was the second crucial aim of US administrations 
and the theorists was even more difficult than economic prog-
ress. The US policymakers declared the support for democratic 
process but quickly appeared that it was not unconditional. 
23  Frank 1969: 163-164. 
24  Frank 1969: 164. 
25  Frank 1969: 164-165. 
| EVOLVING DEPENDENCY RELATIONS | | PARADOXES OF A MODERN IZATION THEORY. . .  |
29 30
American leaders were afraid that suppressing Latin Ameri-
can right-wing dictatorships might open the way for the ele- 
ction of radical and Marxist leftists. Washington initially tried 
to support the reformist left but the growing electoral support 
for movements and politicians, usually incorrectly defined as 
“Communists,” made the US administrations to limit the pro-
motion of democratic process. Moreover, the United States was 
involved in coup d’états which led to the overthrow of legal 
leaders (like in South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic).26
The idea of civilizing the underdeveloped nations by 
Western powers embraced the use of force and maintenance of 
dictatorial, violent regimes. This presupposition was part of the 
very nature of imperialism, which also influenced US foreign 
policy mechanisms at the turn of  the 19th and 20th century.27 
US leaders were determined to implement the moderni- 
zation mechanisms in developing countries to avoid the risk of 
them falling in the communist trap. This determination caused 
that – however liberal the modernization theory was – the tools 
of US policy in many Third World Countries were far from 
liberal. The United States supported coercive, undemocratic re-
gimes and believed that political stability was a conditio sine 
qua non to introduce all other necessary reforms. This approach 
towards Latin America was particularly evident when the L.B. 
Johnson administration adopted a policy which was called the 
Mann Doctrine (after Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs). It guaranteed the acceptance 
of undemocratic regimes by the United States if they controlled 
the territory and were staunchly pro-American and anticom-
munist. The Doctrine assumed that the USA should focus on 
economic development of Latin American countries and pro-
tect US business there. Political stability should create condi-
tions for development and allow local governments to achieve 
social progress.28 
26  Taffet 2007: 47-65; Klare, Arnson 1981: 138-168. 
27  Latham 2011: 14. 
28  Taffet 2007: 60-61. 
There are more examples of such an approach adopted 
by US policymakers during the Cold War. Next to Latin Ameri-
can cases (like Guatemala after the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman) and Chile (the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship), South 
Vietnam and Iran (Shah Reza Pahlavi) can be mentioned. 
South Vietnam is one of the examples of nation-building 
policy. This ambitious US plan was based on the assumption that 
modernization would diminish the devastating consequences 
of colonial past and would make Vietnam less vulnerable to 
the communist ideology from the north. US policymakers be-
lieved in a new Vietnamese nationalism, which was to be one of 
the consequences of the modernization process. Vietnam was 
one of the biggest recipients of US aid until 1961, and after J. F. 
Kennedy became the president, political and military engage-
ment even grew. The growing number of failures in the process 
of modernization in Vietnam led the United States to blame 
the Vietnamese authorities. Americans sought a way to create 
a more legitimate government in South Vietnam, which would 
be able to carry out its transformation to modern state under 
the US aegis.29 As we know, the US policy of intervention in 
Vietnam failed. The USA was unable to create a Vietnamese 
government with actual popular support or the ability to per-
form necessary reforms. 
The practices which are analyzed in this article are not 
historical. The context has changed after the Cold War, but the 
United States still try to implement economic solutions, which 
are considered the only way to achieve economic and social 
progress in developing countries. The Washington Consensus 
has been one of the most illustrious examples of that concept. 
American policymakers still face the same dilemma related to 
the limits of democracy promotion. Limits which are deter-
mined by the present definition of US national security. 
Another weakness of the modernization theory has 
been theorists’ belief that the rejection of traditions and culture 
of the underdeveloped country is natural and have to take place 
29  Latham 2006: 33-38. 
| EVOLVING DEPENDENCY RELATIONS | | PARADOXES OF A MODERN IZATION THEORY. . .  |
31 32
in countries in order to develop. American modernizers, both 
theorists and policymakers considered local political culture, 
traditions and economies as ineffective and doomed to dis-
appear. The modern political and economic solutions, imple-
mented by the United States (or by local governments with US 
support) should destroy old forms of governance and produ- 
ction, which blocked the development of Third World coun-
tries. Especially capitalism was considered the main moder- 
nizing force.30 
The source of the paradox of modernization promo- 
ted by the United States in the developing countries should be 
sought in the American attempt to tie together mechanisms 
that are in fact incompatible. The United States attempted to 
promote development and good governance and – at the same 
time – accepted dictatorial, repressive regimes. The idea that 
implementing solutions, worked out and promoted by US theo-
rists, would inevitably bring social progress, failed. Moreover, 
the United States built new forms of dependency. 
30  Latham 2011: 16-17. 
 
Coles 2002
Coles, R. L.,”Manifest Destiny Adapted for 
1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny 
Interwined,” Sociology of Religion, Volume 63, 
Nr. 4, 2002, pp. 403-426.
Dobbins, et.al. 
2003
America’s Role in Nation-Building, From Ger-
many to Iraq, Dobbins, J. et al., (eds.), Rand, 
Santa Monica, 2003.
Fatalski 2013 Fatalski, M.,”The United States and the Fall of 
the Trujillo Regime,” Ad Americam. Journal of 
American Studies, Nr. 14, 2013. 
Frank 1969 Frank, A. G., Latin America: Underdevelop-
ment or Revolution: Essays on the Development 
of Underdevelopment and the Immediate En-
emy, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969.
Franko 2003 Franko, P., The Puzzle of Latin American Eco-
nomic Development, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2003. 
Gildherus 2006 Gildherus, M. T., “The Monroe Doctrine: 
Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Stud-
ies Quarterly, Volume 36, Nr. 1, 2006.
Hahn, Heiss 2001 Empire and Revolution: The United States and 
the Third World Since 1945, Hahn P. L., Heiss, 
M. A. (eds.), Ohio State University Press, Co-
lumbus, 2001.
Janus 2001 Janus, J., Polska i Czechosłowacja wobec planu 
Marshalla [Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 
face of the Marshall Plan], Kraków, 2001.
Judt 2008 Judt, T., Powojnie. Historia Europy od roku 
1945 [Post-war. History of Europe since 1945], 
Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań, 2008. 
Kennedy 1957 Kennedy, J. F., „A Democrat Looks at Foreign 
Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 36, Nr. 1, 1957.
Kennedy 1960 Kennedy, J. F., The Strategy of Peace, Harper & 
Bros, New York, 1960.
Kissinger 2002 Kissinger, H., Dyplomacja [Diplomacy], Philip 
Wilson, Warszawa, 2002. 
B IBL IOGRAPHY
| EVOLVING DEPENDENCY RELATIONS | | PARADOXES OF A MODERN IZATION THEORY. . .  |
33 34
Klare, Arnson 1981 Klare, M. T., Arnson, C., Exporting Repression: 
U.S. Support for Authoritarianism in Latin 
America, in: Capitalism and the State in U.S. 
Latin American Relations, Fagen R. R.  (ed.), 
Stanford, 1981.
Knothe 1976 Knothe, T., Ameryka Łacińska w polityce 
USA, 1945-1975 [Latin America in US policy, 
1945-1975], Ossolineum, Wrocław, Warszawa, 
Kraków, Gdańsk, 1976.
Krasuski 1988 Krasuski, J., Europa Zachodnia po II wojnie 
światowej: dzieje polityczne [Western Europe 
after the World War II: political history], 
Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań, 1988. 
Kula 1991 Kula, M., Narodowe i rewolucyjne [National 
and revolutionary], Aneks, London, Warszawa, 
1991.
Latham 2000 Latham, M., Modernization as Ideology: Amer-
ican Social Science and “Nation Building” in the 
Kennedy Era, The University of North Caro-
lina Press,Chapel Hill, 2000. 
Latham 2006 Latham, M., “Redirecting the Revolution? 
The USA and the failure of nation-building in 
South Vietnam,” Third World Quarterly, Vol-
ume 27, Nr. 1, 2006. 
Latham 2011 Latham, M., The Right Kind of Revolution: 
Modernization, Development and U.S. Foreign 
Policy from the Cold War to the Present, Cor-
nell University Press, Ithaca, London, 2011. 
Milikan, Rostow 
1957
Millikan, M. F., Rostow, W. W., A Proposal: 
Key to An Effective Foreign Policy, Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1957. 
Rabe 1988 Rabe, S. G., Eisenhower and Latin America. 
The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism, Chapel 
Hill, 1988. 
Rostow 1960 Rostow, W. W., The Stages of Economic Growth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press,Cambridge,1960.
Schoultz 2003 Schoultz, L., Beneath the United States. A 
History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, 
Cambridge, 2003.
Smith 1994 Smith, G., The Last Years of the Monroe Doc-
trine, 1945-1993, Hill and Wang, New York, 
1994.
Taffet 2007 Taffet, J. F., Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy. The 
Alliance for Progress in Latin America, Rout-
ledge, New York, 2007.
Zubok, Pleszakow 
1999
Zubok, W., Pleszakow, K., Zimna wojna zza 
kulis Kremla [Cold War from behindKremlin’s 
scenes], Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1999. 
Marcin Fatalski is Assistant Professor at the Chair of 
American Studies, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Po-
land. His academic interests areas are: history of inter-
national relations, modern world history, history of the 
United States and US policy toward Latin America.
Fatalski, Marcin, “Paradoxes of a modernization theory 
in the U.S. policy: petrifying authoritarianism and build-
ing client states in the third world during the Cold War” 
in: Evolving dependency relations, edited by: A. Filipiak, 
E. Kania, J. Van den Bosch, R. Wiśniewski, Revolutions 
Research Center, Poznań, 2014, pp. 17-34
